


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


PRICETAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Increased Pressures on North Vietnam (U)

- 1. (U) Reference is made to:
- a. NSAM 288, dated 17 March 1964, subject: "Implementation of South Vietnam Program (U)."
- b. JCSM-982-64, dated 23 November 1964, subject: "Courses of Action in Southeast Asia (U)."
- c. JCSM-811-65, dated 10 November 1965, subject: "Future Operations and Force Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam (U)."
- 2. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to identify those military actions consistent with present policy guidelines which would serve to increase pressures on North Vietnam (NVN), thereby accelerating the rate of progress toward achievement of the US objective in South Vietnam.
- 3. (13) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that NVN is paying heavily for its aggression and has lost the initiative in the South. They further consider that many factors—though not uniform nor necessarily controlling—indicate a military trend favorable to Free World Forces in Vietnam. South Vietnam, in the face of great difficulty, is making slow progress on all fronts—military, political, and economic. However, pace of progress indicates that, if acceleration is to be achieved, an appropriate increase in military pressure is required.



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- 4. (5) Military operations in Southeast Asia have been conducted within a framework of policy guidelines established to achieve US objectives without expanding the conflict. Principal among these policy guidelines are:
 - a. We seek to avoid widening the war into a conflict with Communist China or the USSR.
 - b. We have no present intention of invading NVN.
 - c. We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of NVN.
 - d. We are guided by the principles set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.
- 5. (PAlthough some progress is being made within this framework, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the rate of progress has been and continues to be slow, largely because US military power has been restrained in a manner which has reduced significantly its impact and effectiveness. Limitations have been imposed on military operations in four ways:
 - a. The attacks on the enemy military targets have been on such a prolonged, graduated basis that the enemy has adjusted psychologically, economically, and militarily; e.g., inured themselves to the difficulties and hardships accompanying the war, dispersed their logistic support system, and developed alternate transport routes and a significant air defense system.
 - b. Areas of sanctuary, containing important military targets, have been afforded the enemy.
 - c. Covert operations in Cambodia and Laos have been restricted.
 - d. Major importation of supplies into NVN by sea has been permitted.
- 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that US objectives in Southeast Asia can be achieved within the policy framework set forth in paragraph 4, above, providing the level of assistance the enemy receives from his communist allies is not significantly increased and there is no diminution of US efforts. However, progress will continue to be slow so long as present limitations on military operations continue in effect. Further, at our present pace, termination of NVN's military effort is not expected





to occur in the near future. Set forth in the Appendix are those actions which can be taken in the near future within the present framework of policy guidelines to increase pressures on NVN and accelerate progress toward the achievement of US objectives. They require a relaxation or removal of certain limitations on operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that expansion of US efforts entails some additional risk. They believe that as a result of this expansion the likelihood of overt introduction of Soviet Bloc/CPR combat forces into the war would be remote. Failure to take additional action to shorten the Southeast Asia conflict also entails risks as new and more efficient weapons are provided to NVN by the Soviet Union and as USSR/CPR support of the enemy increases.

- 7. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that they be authorized to direct the actions in the Appendix.
- 8. (S) This memorandum is intended to respond to the questions raised by the President at the White House luncheon on 12 September 1967; therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that this memorandum be submitted to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

EARLE G. WHEELER Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment



SPECIFIC ACTIONS

	Charges of escalation. Increased use of CPR sirfelds for storage or training, but not for combet missions. Increased GPR AAA and Engineer support in WW.	Soviet Union may cancel existing negotiations with the US and initiate propagatal campaign. Fossible Soviet actions to increase tensions in other parts of the world but major confrontations would be unlikely. CFR would strungten defensive posture and may increase military and an area.	≥ 8	Possible maval and sir reaction by MVN in northern waters. CPR or Seviets might provide additional patrol	NVM air and surface attack possible. USSR or CFR might provide NVM with coast defense missiba.	No immediate reaction other than propagands.	n Possible political reactions.	Souvenna vould probably not object if he could deny the actions and avoid publicity. Posible increased NVA forces and activities in Laos.	Cambodia would protect expansion of operations to Cambodian soil and might seek to defend its territory. Adverse political reaction.	NVN would accuse the United States of attempting
AUVAFTAGES	Greater destruction of NVN war-supporting facilities. Increased destruction of air defenses including airTiclas. Reduce logistic support of NVN/VC. More effective use of wailable forces. Reveals impact on reducing friendly essemities, particularly in critical I Opps/PMZ area. Permits timely reaction against targets of opportunity.	Reduce import of war-supporting meterials.	Interdict internal waterway LOCs. Destroy waterborne logistic crarf and block channels. Require great WWW sweeping effort. Reduce POL and other cargo distribution.	Interdict coastal vater traffic. Reduce use of land 100s by harssing gunfire.	Increase destruction of enemy air forces. Inhibit enemy air operations.	Increased interdiction of 100s and reduction of supplies to MVA/VC.	Greater operational efficiency and quicker reaction time for B-52s.	Disrupt eanctuaries. Increased efficiency of interdiction. Reduce supplies to MA/VC.	Disrupt sanctuaries. Reduce supplies to NNA/VC. Luprove intelligence. Discourage use of Cambodie as sanctuary for NNA/VC forces. Provide self-defense of US forces.	Harass NVM within country. Require NVM to divert resources to internal security.
SPECIFIC ACTIONS	shiphong and Hanol prohibited areas. ty proper. R buffer Zone to longies. Annestricted stanks against LOC, rail Conda up to five miles from CR corder. Conda up five miles from CR corder. Conda up to five miles from CR corder.	h, replenish as required, mine fields in the ches and harbors at Balphone, Hon Gai and a. Publish warning notice to mariners /extend mine fields as necessary to t bypassing.	the of mavigable MVN rivers. Mine mavigable waterway throughout MVN to within 5 MV of rder (authority currently limited to those of 20 N).	offensive mayal surface force operations t NY maintant/Addistic vetercerft and t suitable targets in NY ashore north of latitude to the redefined buffer zone RAGON operations now limited to south of 20° N).	based SAM missiles against NVH aircraft both ster and in airspace over NVN.	e bembing of Lactian vaterways traffic (SEKONG). b special asturation bembing interdiction air- cones in Laco, e.g., northwest of DMZ, Hape Gis Passes.	int of Laos, by day and night, by B-52s en route from targets in Vietnam or Laos. bombing stracks on Laos. requirement for cover strikes in SVN when G targets in Laos.	sauthorized size of exploitation force.	urrent DANTEL BONE reconnaissance program- ending the area of operations for the full of the SVM/Cambodia border; authorize use ms. Toplers; remove limitations on number of R. DANTEL BOONE forces to conduct limited Ge/Gestruction activity; authorize calling in sel airstrikes on enemy targets near the border.	te actions to increase the credibility of a ti notional resistance movement in NYM. i intelligence collection and covert physical iction missions.